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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-NEGOTIATION OF CHECK OFFERED "i N FULL
PAYSiENT"--CREITOR's NOTICE TO DEBTOR TO STOP PAYMENT iF ACCEPTANCE
ix P.rr PAYMrENT UNsATIsFACTORY.-The defendant sent the plaintiff a
check in payment of a freight bill, stating thereon that it was "in full pay-
ment as shown in statement on reverse side." The plaintiff replied that it
would accept the check "on account only" and that if this was not accept-
able the defendant should stop payment. The defendant received the plain-
tiff's reply on the day the check was paid by the defendant's bank. In a
suit for the balance of the bill, the lower court held for the defendant. On
appeal, the verdict was reversed on the ground that there had been no
accord and satisfaction because the claim was liquidated, and that even
assuming the claim to have been unliquidated or in dispute, the plaintiff's
acceptance and deposit of the check could not have constituted an accord
and satisfaction since he had not assented to a compromise. bloore &
McCormack Co. v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 37 F. (2d) 308 (C. C. A. 4th,
1930).
The acceptance and negotiation of a check purporting to be "in full
satisfaction" of a disputed or unliquidated claim constitutes an accord
and satisfaction in spite of a refusal to accept the check on those terms.
Breck -v. Rosenfeld, 124 Misc. 363, 208 N. Y. Supp. 35 (1st Dep't 1925);
Hoop v. Kansas Flour Mills Co., 124 Kan. 769, 262 Pac. 544 (1928); 3
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1854; (1926) 21 ILL. L. Rnv. 287. But cf.
Den ules v. Jewel Tea Co., 103 Minn. 150, 114 N. W. 733 (1908). And
mere retention of the check for an unreasonable time without protest has
generally been held to constitute a complete discharge. Willis v. City Na-
tinnal Bank, 280 S. NV. 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (year and half); Wect-
ern Pacific Land Co. v. Wilson, 19 Cal. App. 338, 125 Pac. 1076 (1912)
(month); cf. Unterberger & Co. v. Wiley, 170 Ark. 976, 281 S. V1. 899
j1926) (retention for over month, without cashing, after refusal to ac-
cept on condition specified held a discharge); cf. Warcester Color Co. v.
Henry Wood's Sons Co., 209 Mass. 105, 95 N. E. 392 (1911) (creditor's ob-
literation of "in full settlement" without knowledge or consent of debtor of
no operative effect). But where the creditor has informed the debtor that
he would accept "in part payment" only, the debtor's failure to respond
has, in the light of other circumstances, been held a tacit acquiescence and
a waiver of the condition on which the check was offered. Campbell County
v. Howard, 133 Va. 19, 112 S. E. 876 (1922) (payment after notice by
creditor that he would not accept in full payment); Laroe V. Sugar Loaf
Dairy Co., 180 N. Y. 367, 73 N. E. 61 (1905) (payment after notice and
continued action under the contract); Levy & Koplan v. Queen Co., 73 Pa.
Super. Ct. 425 (1910) (check sent back after return by creditor held
presumably sent in accordance with terms in creditor's refusal); see
Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231, 236, 33 N. E. 1034, 1035 (1893) ; cf. Burton
Coal Co. v. Gorman Coal Co., 22 Ohio 383, 153 N. E. 863 (1926) (debtor
replied that matter was "up to" plaintiff). Yet silence alone on the part
of the debtor does not constitute acquiescence in the creditor's response.
Seeds, Grain & Hay Co. v. Conger, 83 Ohio St. 169, 93 N. E. 892 (1910);
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cf. List & Son Co. v. Chase, 80 Ohio St. 42, 88 N. E. 120 (1909) (silence is
not a waiver of conditions). Thus the debtor is not penalized for his
failure to act affirmatively in reply to the creditor's conditional acceptance.
Cf. Cincinnati Equipment Co. v. Big Muddy Rivey Consol. Coal Co., 158
Ky. 247, 164 S. W. 794 (1914) (silence alone is not acceptance of a counter-
offer unless expressly agreed) ; ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1921) 93n.
Moreover, even assuming the existence of such a duty to act, the time to stop
payment afforded the debtor in the instant case seems clearly insufficient.
Thus the instant decision seems justifiable only on the alternative ground
that the debt was liquidated.
BANKS AND BANKING-SET-OFF-RATE OF EXCHANG--EFFECT OF WAR ON
ACCOUNTS IN ENEMY STATES.-In an action by an Austrian bank to recover
from a Pittsburgh bank money which the Alien Property Custodian had re-
turned to the defendant as the amount of its kronen balance in the Austrian
bank, it appeared that prior to 1916 the plaintiff had maintained a dollar
balance with the defendant, and the defendant a kronen balance with the
plaintiff. The defendant sought to set-off its kronen balance at the rate of
exchange prevailing before the war. The district court ruled that the defend-
ant could not set-off at the pre-war rate, its account not having been ma-
tured by the declaration of war nor by the passage of the Trading With the
Enemy Act [40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 30 (1926)] and no step
having been taken to set off the deposit before the suit. On appeal, the
judgment was affirmed. First National Bank v. Anglo-Oestorreichische
Bank 37 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930).
In the absence of the debtor's insolvency, a bank is generally not entitled
to apply a deposit to an unmatured debt of its depositor. Putnam v.
United States Trust Co., 223 Mass. 199, 111 N. W. 969 (1916); Fifth Na-
tiowal Bank v. Lyttle, 250 Fed. 361 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918). However, the
mutual debts in the instant case were clearly obligations due on de-
mand. Cf. Zimmerman v. Hicks, 7 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925). And,
for set-off purposes, a bank may treat a demand obligation of its depositor
as matured without any actual demand having been made. Citizens' Sav-
ings Bank v. Vaughan, 115 Mich. 156, 73 N. W. 143 (1897) ; People v. St.
Nichola Bank, 44 App. Div. 313, 60 N. Y. Supp. 719 (1st Dep't 1899).
Of course, an actual demand is required before a depositor may success-
fully bring suit to recover his deposit from a bank, but in as much as the
purpose of this rule is merely to prevent unwarranted litigation there
seems no reason why it should apply to set-offs. However, according to
the finding that the defendant had done no acts to indicate that it had in
fact set off its kronen deposit against the amount owed to the plaintiff,
the dollar value of the defendant's kronen deposit would be determined
by its exchange value at the time of judgment, regardless of when the
debts matured. Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U. S. 517, 47 Sup. Ct.
166 (1926). Such a result is in accord with the usual rule that where an
obligation is in terms of foreign currency, payable in the foreign country,
only the dollar value measured at the time of judgment can be recovered
in a United States court. The Hurona, 268 Fed. 910 (S. D. N. Y. 1920);
Sinie v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N. Y. Supp. 52 (1st Dep't 1921);
Metcalf v. Mayer, 213 App. Div. 607, 211 N. Y. Supp. 53 (1st Dep't 1925) ;
cf. Societe des Hotel- v. Cummings, [1922] 1 K. B. 451 (similar rule in
England). On the other hand, where a payment in terms of foreign cur-
rency is due in this country, damages are customarily translated into United
States money at the exchange rate prevailing at the breach or maturity
date. Det Farenede Dampskibs Selskab v. Ins. Co. of North America, 31
F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) ; Hicks v. Guiness, 269 U. S. 71, 46 Sup.
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Ct. 46 (1925); cf. Lebeaupin v. Crispn, [1920] 2 K. B. 714; In re Britigh
American Bank, [1922] 2 Ch. 575 (similar rule in England). It seems,
however, that the defendant in the instant case could have avoided the loss
resulting from a decline in foreign currency values by an act unmistakably
evidencing its intention to set off; for the balance, since payable to the
plaintiff bank in the United States, would thereby have been fixed at the
exchange rate at the date of set-off, a new obligation to pay that balance
then arising as in an account stated. Cf. Reed v. Robinson, 213 Ala. 14,
104 So. 130 (1925); Benjamin v, Levy, 176 N. Y. Supp. 454 (Sup. CL
1919). Certainly, neither the war itself nor the Trading with the Enemy
Act so abrogated the agreement between the parties as to make such a
procedure impossible. See (1929) 39 YAL L. J. 286. Of course, fairness
to the plaintiff would have required that, once the defendant had determined
to set off, its election should be held irrevocable, and notice of such election
given to the plaintiff.
BuS AND NOTES-TIME INSTRUMENTS-DIscouNT PROVISIONS AS AFFECT-
ING NEGOTLAILTY.-The plaintiff brought suit on a promissory note made
by the defendant payable to X, and indorsed by him to the plaintiff. The
note was payable $200 six nionths and $200 twelve months from date, with
the privilege of discharging "by payment of principal less a discount of
five per centum within thirty days from the date hereof." The defendant
alleged failure of consideration, and the trial court directed a verdict for
the plaintiff. On appeal the judgment was reversed on the ground that the
note did not contain a promise to pay a "sum certain" as required by the
Negotiable Instruments Law. Waterhouse v. Chouurd, 149 AtI. 21 (Me.
1930).
No uniformity of result has been reached on the issue of negotiability
in time instruments providing for discounts from their face amount. (1)
Where there has been a provision for discount if the instrument is paid
"at" maturity, it has been held negotiable. Capital City State Bank v.
Swift, 290 Fed. 505 (E. D. Okla. 1923); Mansfield Savings Bank v. Miller,
2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 96 (1887); of. Commercial Credit Co. v. Nissen, 49
S. D. 303, 207 N. W. 61 (1926). (2) If the instrument permits a discount
upon payment in full at the maturity of a specified installment, the de-
cisions have been divided. Stevens v. Baldy, 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 145 (1917)
(held negotiable); Harrison -v. Hunter, 168 S. W. 1036 (Tex. Civ. App.
1914) (held negotiable); Lambert v. Harrison, 69 Okla. 172, 171 Pac. 45
(1918) (held non-negotiable as not being a promise for a "sum certain").
(3) When a note provides for a discount if payment is made "on or before"
maturity, it has been held negotiable. Loring v. Andersen, 95 Minn. 101,
103 N. W. 722 (1905); cf. Union Nat. Bank v. Mayfield, 71 Okla. 22, 174
Pac. 1034 (1918). (4) An instrument providing for discount if paid any
time before maturity, has been held non-negotiable as not being a promise
for a "sum certain." Way v. Smith, 111 Mlass. 523 (1873) ; National Bank
of Commerce v. Feeney, 12 S. D. 156, 80 N. W. 186 (1899). (5) And a
provision for discount if the note is paid on or before a specified date prior
to maturity has been held not to preclude negotiability. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Planck, 98 Neb. 225, 152 N. W. 390 (1915); First National
Bank v. Rooney, 11 D. L. R. 358 (Sask. 1915). Yet such a provision has
frequently been used as a basis for denying negotiability on the ground
that the instrument did not contain a promise for a "sum certain." Story
'v. Lamb, 52 Mich. 525 (1884); Fralick v. Norton, 2 blich. 130 (1851);
First National Bank v. Watson, 56 Okla. 495, 155 Pac. 1152 (1916);
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. -v. McCoy & Spivey Bros., 32 Okla. -277, 122
Pac. 125 (1911); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Devear, Hair & Co., 2
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Tenn. Civ. App. 366 (1911). This apparent tendency to declare against
negotiability where a discount is provided for if payment is made before
maturity, may be a reflection of the common law view that "on or before"
instruments bearing interest were uncertain as to amount since payment
might be made at any time. Stults v. Silva, 119 Mass. 137 (1875); cf.
Lowell Tust Co. v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 379, 67 N. E. 363 (1903). But cf.
Pierce v. Talbot, 213 Mass. 330, 100 N. E. 553 (1913). Contra: Leader v.
Plante, 95 Me. 339, 50 Atl. 53 (1901). But this view is no longer tenable
as to interest provisions, since the Negotiable Instruments Law provides
expressly that an "on or before" provision does not affect negotiability and
that a note may be negotiable though payable "with interest." The attempt
of the court in the instant case to distinguish between "discount" and
"interest" is unconvincing. Both are but means of charging for the use
of credit. Moreover the amount due under the various "discount" instru-
ments is just as readily an ascertainable "sum certain" at any particular
moment as would be the amount due at any given time on an interest-bear-
ing "on or before" instrument. In view of the evident commercial need for
discount provisions in time instruments and the recognition of negotiability
accorded such instruments by other recent decisions, the court might well
have held the instant note negotiable.
BROKERS-STOCK-BROKERS-MARGIN T R A N S A CT 10 N s-AGREEMENT TO
WAIVE RIGHT TO NOTICE BEFORE SALE.-A stockbrokers' agreement in a
margin transaction provided that if the customer failed to comply with
any of its terms, the brokers would be privileged to sell without notice,
and that "no specific demand or notice shall invalidate this waiver." The
customer's margin having become insufficient the brokers notified him that
stop-loss orders had been placed on all his stocks. A day later the brokers
sent a second notice, advising that unless they received additional margin
immediately, they would sell at market. Before the customer had received
this second notice and pursuant thereto, the brokers sold him out. In an
action for conversion for selling without reasonable notice, the customer
recovered a verdict. A motion to set aside the verdict was denied on the
ground that the brokers, by setting stop-loss orders on the customer's
stocks, had waived their discretionary privilege of sale without notice.
Klapp v. Bache, 239 N. Y. Supp. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
In the absence of special agreement, a broker who sells stocks purchased
on margin without first demanding more security and allowing the customer
a reasonable time to comply with this demand is guilty of a conversion.
Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235 (1869); Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S.
365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512 (1908) ; Note (1925) 41 A. L. R. 1255; Note (1930) 43
HARV. L. REv. 628. But cf. Papadopulos v. Bright, 264 Mass. 42, 161 N. E.
799 (1928) ; Bentnick v. London Joint Stock Bank, 2 Ch. 120, 140 (1893);
Smith, Margin Storks (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 485, 492. In New York the
broker has been further required to send a notice of intent to sell specifying
both time and place. Content v. Banner, 184 N. Y. 121, 76 N. E. 913
(1906); Mayer v. Monzo, 221 N. Y. 442, 117 N. E. 948 (1917). The cus-
tomer, however, can waive his right to demand or notice by special agree-
ment, provided such agreement be not contrary to the rules of the Ex-
change. Smith v. Craig, 211 N. Y. 456, 105 N. E. 798 (1914); see Evans
v. Hubbard, 220 App. Div. 423, 426, 221 N. Y. S. 642, 645 (1st Dep't
1927); Stibbard v. Owen, 243 Mich. 138, 139, 219 N. W. 636 (1928). But
though such special agreements usually stipulate "that in all marginal
business the broker may close transactions by the sale or purchase of
securities at his discretion when the margin is near exhaustion without
further notice to the customer," the courts hesitate to give full effect to
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such a provision. Cf. Sanger r. Price, 114 App. Div. 78, 99 N. Y. Supp.
513 (1st Dep't 1906) (similar provision held to contemplate some original
notice to customer that his margins were being depleted); Thopiapson v.
Baily, 220 N. Y. 471, 116 N. E. 387 (1917) (burden of proving customer's
"acceptance" of such a provision, printed on the standard form of state-
ment, held to rest on broker) ; Pearson v,. Kurtz, 280 Pa. 34, 124 Ati. 272
(1924); Evans v. Hubbard, supra. But cf. StibIard r. Owen, supra. The
tendency of the courts has been to protect the customer's interest in being
notified of failing margins, express agreements of waiver notwithstanding.
See Rosenthal v. Brown, 247 N. Y. 479, 485, 160 N. E. 921, 923 (1928);
Small v. Honsman, 208 N. Y. 115, 126, 101 N. E. 700, 704 (1913) ; Miller &
Co. v. Lyons, 113 Va. 275, 290, 74 S. E. 194, 201 (1912); cf. Toplitz v.
Bauer, 161 N. Y. 325, 333, 55 N. E. 1059, 1061 (1900) ; CAMPBELL, LAW OF
STOCK-BROKERS (2d ed. 1922) 130. But cf. Godfrey v. Newman, 239 N. Y.
Supp. 585 (Sup. Ct. 1930). But it is difficult to justify the result in the
case of an experienced margin trader who has diligently followed the tape
and seeks, by taking refuge in a technicality, to Prcape a loss arising from
a speculation whose dangers he well realizes.
CoMMioN CARRERS--PowER OF FRANCHISING Co0r5II$SION TO ORDER EQUAL
Bus ACCOimODATIONS FOR NnROEs.-The defendant Commission was au-
thorized by statute to grant franchises to bus operators, and to make rules
governing the transportation of passengers for hire. [N. C. PuB. Lmaws
(1927) c. 136 § 7]. Some of the respondent bus operators had refused to
carry negroes, and none had supplied separate accommodations for them.
The plaintiffs petitioned the defendant to require that separate and equal
bus and station accommodations be provided for negroes. The petition was
dismissed by the defendant on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to
pronounce the respondents common carriers and thus obliged to carry
negroes. The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court of North Carolina
which issued an order requiring the defendant to grant plaintiff's petition.
On appeal by the defendant the decree was affirmed. Corporation Commis-
sion v. Transportation Committee on Interracial Cooperation, 151 S.
E. 648 (N. C. 1930).
The Federal statute of 1875 prohibiting discrimination because of race
in theatres and other places of public amusement was held unconstitutional.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18 (1883). But similar state
statutes relating to a variety of enterprises have since been upheld. Peo-
ple v. King, 110 N. Y. 418, 18 N. E. 245 (1888); Pickcftt r. Kehan, 323
Ill. 138, 153 N. E. 667 (1926); (1927) 11 MINN. L. Rnv. 463; cf. Rhone
v. Loonds, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N. W. 31 (1898); (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 1002.
However, even in the absence of a civil rights statute, common carriers
of passengers cannot refuse applicants solely on account of race. Pleasant3
v. North Beach R. R., 34 Cal. 586 (1868) ; Chlirago & N. 11'. Ry. 7. Willi,,:s,
55 Il1. 185 (1870); cf. Day r. Owc, 5 Mich. 520 (1858). Passenger bus
lines operating under a state franchise are usually held to be common
carriers. Dobosen v. Mlescall, 205 App. Div. 265, 199 N. Y.Supv,. A0 c4th
Dep't 1923); Frick v. Cit! of Gary, 192 Ind. 76, 1'15 X. E. 1 ,46 (1922).
Since the respondents in the instant case purported to carry all passeng r .
at the time the franchises were obtained, a refusal on their part to carry
negroes would seem unjustified. Recognition of the rights of negroes to
transportation in common carriers, however, has not invalidated railroad
regulations for the separation of the races where the accommodations for
both races are substantially equal. Westchester & Pidla. R. R. v. Miles,
55 Pa. 209 (1867) ; Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 218 U. S. 71, 30 Sup.
Ct. 667 (1910). Similarly, state statutes requiring separate but equal
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accommodations in railroads and street cars have been held constitutional.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138 (1896); Smith v. State,
100 Tenn. 494, 46 S. W. 566 (1898); So. Covington Street Ry. v. Kentucky,
252 U. S. 399, 40 Sup. Ct. 378 (1920) ; cf. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 185
(1877). The policy behind the principal case is therefore in accord with
that of the majority of the southern states in so far as it involves the
separation of the races. See (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 858; Stephenson, Race
Discriminations in American Law (1909) 43 AM. L. REv. 695. But inas-
much as no provision for negro passengers is required by the statute creat-
ing the Corporation Commission, the instant court has taken an affirmative
stand for the protection of negroes both in ordering that provision be made
for them and in vesting the Commission with the power to enforce such an
order.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE RESTRICTING USE OF
PUBLIC MARKET TO PRODUCERS OF FARm PRODUCTS.-The defendant was
convicted of violating an ordinance restricting the privilege of selling farm
products in the public market to "producers who have grown and brought
them to market." On appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the
information the defendant contended that the enforcement of the ordinance
would deprive him of the equal protection of the laws. The decision of
the lower court was affirmed, however, on the ground that the differences
between producers and non-producers made the classification a reasonable
one. State v. Cullun, 110 Conn. 291, 147 AtI. 804 (1929).
At common law, forestalling, ie., buying goods from producers for the
purpose of reselling in the public market at a profit, was an offense punish-
able by fine and imprisonment. Rex v. Waddington, 1 East 143 (1801).
A similar attitude is to be observed in many early American decisions sus-
taining the reasonableness of ordinances substantially like that of the
instant case. City of Louisville v. Roupe, 6 B. Mon. 591 (Ky. 1846) ; In re
Nightingale, 11 Pick. 167 (Mass. 1831); Commonwealth v. Rice, 9 Metc.
253 (Mass. 1845). Although no constitutional issue was directly raised
by these decisions, there is some case authority for sustaining the constitu-
tionality of such an ordinance as is set out in the instant opinion. Gatto
v. Gilmore, 126 Misc. 47, 213 N. Y. Supp. 217 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Brtce v.
City of Gainesville, 183 S. W. 41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). Furthermore the
many statutes and decisions exempting cooperative marketing associations
from the penalties of the anti-trust laws and from the assessment of an
income tax afford positive support for the view that it is reasonable to
favor the farmer as a class. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco
Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291 (1927), aff'g 208 Ky.
643, 271 S. W. 695 (1925); Rifle Potato Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Smith,
78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937 (1925); Minnesota Wheat Growers' Co-op. Ass'n
v. Huggins, 162 Minn. 471, 203 N. W. 420 (1925); 38 STAT. '731 (1914),
15 U. S. C. § 17 (1926); 44 STAT. 40 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 982 (1926);
Ky. SAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 883f-28; see Hamilton, Judicial Tolerance of
Fa-nrs' Cooperatives (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 936. But ef. In 'e cGrice, 79
Fed. 627 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1897) ; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
U. S. 540, 22 Sup. Ct. 431 (1900) (since "distinguished" many times). The
most recent manifestation of a similar policy is to be found in the Agricul-
tural Marketing Act and the activities of the Federal Farm Board pursuant
thereto. 7 U. S. C. § 521 (1929).
CONTRACTS-COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE--PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
RESTRICTION Too EXTENSIVE IN ScoPE.-In a contract for the sale of an ice
company situated in Dallas the seller bound himself not to undertake in the
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state of Texas for five years any line of business in which the company was
engaged. Before the termination of the five year period, the seller founded
another ice company in Dallas. At the buyer's request, the lower court
granted an injunction restraining the seller from engaging in such business
anywhere in the state. It was held on appeal that the decree be affirmed
but that, in view of the local nature of the plaintiff's business, it be modi-
fied to embrace only'the city of Dallas. Hill v. Central West Public Service
Ice Co., 37 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
In the early cases and in general today, contracts not to compete are
held invalid because they deprive the covenantor of his livelihood and the
community of the benefits of competition. Dier's Case, Y. B. 2 Hen. ',
f. 5, pl. 26 (1415); Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 193 Ill. 420, 61 N.
E. 1038 (1901); see Mitchel v. Reywlds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 190 (1711);
Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 51, 54 (1837). Courts early began to
recognize the validity of such covenants, however, when they were ancillary
to the sale of a business and necessary to ensure its full value to the pur-
chaser. Rogers v. Parry, 2 Bulst. 136 (1613); Broad v. Jollyfe. Cro. Jac.
596 (1620); Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawks, 171 Mass. 101, 50 N. E. 509
(1898). Agreements by partners not to compete during the life of the
partnership, and by retiring partners not to compete for a term of years
were also granted validity by courts and legislators. Ropes v. Upton, 125
Mass. 258 (1877); Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519 (1853); WILLISTo. ,
CONTRACTS (1920) § 1664; CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) §§ 1673-1675:
N. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (1913) §§ 5928-5930; S. D. REV. CODE (1919) §§
898-900; OKLA. COMP. STAT. ANN. (1921) §§ 5071-5073. But such cove-
nants were frequently considered invalid if unlimited in regard to extent
of territory. Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, supra; Roberts v. Le"Zont,
73 Neb. 365, 102 N. W. '770 (1905); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 10G N.
Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 (1887). Contra: Fox v. Barber, 94 Kan. 212, 146
Pac. 364 (1915). The growing tendency of the courts, however, is to dis-
card arbitrary rules as to space and hold that any covenant reasonably
necessary to protect the interests of the parties is enforceable. .\ordei-
feldt, v. Nordenfeldt A-ms Co., [1894] A. C. 535; Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western
Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915); Williams r. Thom-
son, 143 Minn. 454, 174 N. W. 307 (1919); see U. S. v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 279 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898). And when a covenant,
taken as a whole, is so unduly extensive as to be invalid, it has been held
that, if its restrictions are severable from each other, those portions which
are lawful will be enforced and the remainder discarded. Mallan r. May,
11 M. & W. 652 (1843) (London or elsewhere); Smitlis Appeal, 113 Pa.
579, 6 Atl. 25 (1886) (Lehigh or elsewhere); Rogers v. Maddorlx,
[1892] 3 Ch. 346 (covenant not to sell malt liquor or aerated waters).
Contra: More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251 (1870) (county of San Francisco and
state of California). It has also been held in a few cases, as illustrated
by the instant decision, that even though the covenant is not thus divisible
and is in certain respects broader than the law allows, it will be enforced
in so far as its provisions come within the law. Raqsdale r,. Nagle, 106
Cal. 332, 39 Pac. 628 (1895); Gregory v. Spickcr, 110 Cal. 150, 42 Pac. 576
(1895). These cases recognize the fact that the distinction between re-
strictive covenants which specify separately the territories and objects to
which thcy apply, and those stated in more general terms, is merely one
of form, and accordingly enforce a desirable form of trade contract while
restricting it -ithin reasonable limits.
CORPORATIONS-CONVERTIBLE STOCK-REFUSAL TO CONVERT STOCK OF
NoN-REcoRD HoLDER.-Upon reorganization in 1916, the defendant railroad
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corporation issued preferred stock convertible into common stock any time
after November 1, 1919. The certificate of incorporation gave this option
to "Any holder . . . of the Preferred Stock .... " By virtue of an
assignment of a "street" certificate the plaintiff became the owner but
not the record holder of 100 shares of such preferred stock. On February
8, 1927, the plaintiff presented the stock certificate at the proper office
and demanded 100 shares of common stock, but the defendant refused to
convert the stock until February 24, 1927. The plaintiff alleged that he
had intended to sell such common stock at the market price on February'
8 and sought damages based upon the difference between the market prices
of the preferred and common on that date. In defence the defendant
claimed, inter alia, that the plaintiff was not a stockholder of record and
that his damages were merely speculative. A motion to strike out the
defendant's answer was denied by the trial court. The decision was affirmed
on appeal but leave was granted to file an amended complaint, the court
maintaining that the plaintiff could not recover except as a holder of record
and that the allegations of damage were "founded on a mere gesture" or
"hope for gain." Cheatham v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry., 37 F. (2d) 593 (S. D.
N. Y. 1930).
As between the assignee and the assignor, who remains the record holder,
an assignment of shares creates complete ownership in the assignee. Ben-
son v. Saffert-Gugisburg Cement Const. Co., 159 Minn. 54, 198 N. W. 297
(1924); CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER OF STOCk (1929) 65 et seq. And despite
various dicta to the contrary, such an assignment does give rise to certain
legal relationships between the assignee and the corporation before a
transfer on the record books. Robinson v. National Bank, 95 N. Y. 637
(1884) (non-record holder secured transfer of stock and payment of divi-
dends declared). In re Hastings, 56 Misc. 45, 106 N. Y. Supp. 938 (Sup. Ct.
1907) (executor permitted to inspect corporate books) ; Petty v. Knight-
Petty Mercantile Co., 93 Okla. 187, 220 Pac. 835 (1923) (non-record holder
allowed to "participate in the organization and conduct of the business") ;
Van Tuyl v. Robin, 160 App. Div. 41, 144 N. Y. Supp. 963 (1st Dep't 1913),
aff'd, 211 N. Y. 540, 105 N. E. 1101 (1914) (under statute "equitable
owner" considered a "stock holder" for purposes of corporate liability);
First National Bank v. De Moulin, 56 Cal. App. 313, 205 Pac. 92 (1922).
The reasons advanced for requiring a corporation to recognize only holders
of record for purposes of voting, payment of dividends, and other acts
involving corporate protection do not seem applicable to this situation
as the presentation of a "street" certificate would seem to give sufficient
notice to the corporation of the extinguishment of the record-holder's in-
terests and the acquisition of those interests by the assignee. Cf. Guaran-
tee Co. v. East Rome Town Co., 96 Ga. 511, 23 S. E. 503 (1895); Porter v.
Marine Savings Bank, 186 Mich. 355, 153 N. W. 19 (1915). And in the
absence of definite provision in the certificate of incorporation or on the
stock certificate restricting the privilege of conversion to holders of record,
it is thought that the plaintiff in the instant case should have been accorded
the rights and privileges allowed the assignee of any contract obligation.
Cf. Sylvania & Gira rd R. R. v. Hoge, 129 Ga. 734, 59 S. E. 806 (1907);
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 151. If the plaintiff was
possessed of the assignor's rights and privileges the refusal to convert
was clearly a breach of contract. Cf. U. S. Cities. Corp. v. Sautbine, 126
Okla. 173, 259 Pac. 253 (1927). Then three possible remedies should have
been available. As in the case of a wrongful refusal to transfer shares, a
decree for specific performance might be secured. See Oden v. Vaughn,
204 Ala. 445, 44T, 85 So. 779, 781 (1902) ; cf. CHRisTY, op. cit. supra at 468.
Or the refusal to convert might be treated as a wrongful exercise of
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dominion over the shares and the action brought in tort for conversion.
U. S. Cities Corp. v. Sautbine, supra. Finally as in the instant case, an
action might be brought for damages for breach of contract, the measure
of recovery usually being the difference in market value of the respective
shares on the date of breach. Cf. Manufacturers Fire & Marin Ins. Co.
v. Middlesex R. R., 146 Mass. 224, 16 N. E. 34 (1888); Berle, Convertible
Bon-ai, and Stock Warrants (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 649, 654.
CORPORATIONS-RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENT FOR TORTs OF SusstDLRY-
EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO SHow AssImnAToN.--An action was brought
against the defendant railroad corporation by the administrator of the de-
ceased to recover for the death of the intestate killed by the negligence
of a subsidiary company of the defendant. Evidence was introduced that
the train which struck the deceased bore the name of the defendant, and
that the initials of the defendant appeared on the uniforms of its crew.
The train appeared on the defendant's time tables but its crew were paid by
the subsidiary. It was further alleged that the defendant owned a majority
of the subsidiary's stock and that the defendant's claim agent in several let-
ters to the plaintiff had indicated that he expected the plaintiff to look to the
defendant for recovery. In upholding the trial court's denial of the de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict, the appellate court held that suffi-
cient evidence of the subsidiary's assimilation by the parent had been in-
troduced to make that question one of fact for jury. Ros v. Pennsylvania
R. R., 148 Atl. 741 (N. J. 1930).
Whether a court will disregard the fiction of the corporate entity and
allow the parent corporation to be held liable for the torts of a subsidiary
depends on the extent of assimilation of the two corporations. Cf. Bergen-
thai v. State Garage & Trucwking Co., 179 Wis. 42, 190 N. W. 901 (1922) ;
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Cochran, 43 Kan. 225, 23 Pac. 151 (1890). The
fact of assimilation is said to be a jury question whenever evidence is
introduced indicating that the subsidiary is the mere "agent," "tool," "in-
strument," "alter ego," or "dummy" of the parent. See Surmmo v. Snare
& Triest Co., 166 App. Div. 425, 429, 152 N. Y. Supp. 29, 32 (2d Dep't
1915); cf. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pie Co., 141 Md. 67,
85, 118 Atl. 279, 285 (1922) ; Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N. Y. 84, 94,
155 N. E. 58, 61 (1926); BAILZANINE, PmvATE CORPORATIONS (1927) 34;
Douglas and Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Cor-
porations (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 193 et seq. More particularly such evidence
must generally point to something beyond control exerted through the
ownership of the majority or all of the voting stock of the subsidiary.
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., supra. For in addition
to stock control, there must be evidence of an actual intermingling of the
operations of the two companies as shown by common book-keeping, iden-
tical management or inadequate financing of the subsidiary. Costan V.
Manila Electric Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) (manager of
subsidiary's properties employed by parent and subject to supervision of
parent only); Chicago Economic Fuel Gas Co. v. Myers, 168 Ill. 139, 48
N. E. 66 (1897) (employees passed indiscriminately from one company to
the other); Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co., 134 Minn. 209,
158 N. W. 979 (1916) (inadequate financing and direct control by parent) ;
The WVillem Van Driel, Sr., 252 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) (999 year
lease and accounts of subsidiary handled only by the parent); Oriental
Investment Co. v. Barclay, 64 S. W. 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) (existence
of subsidiary unknown to employees); Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Holbrook,
168 Ky. 128, 181 S. W. 993 (1916) (rental of quarry by parent to sub-
sidiary so high as to make profits by subsidiary impossible); Otway v.
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Snare & Triest Co., 167 App. Div. 128, 152 N. Y. Supp. 845 (2d Dep't 1915)
(signs on building, marks on tools and method of hiring indicated complete
control by parent); Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Dupont, 128 Fed. 840 (C. C. A.
2d, 1904) (ticket sold by parent made no mention of subsidiary). The
opinion of the instant decision shows little such evidence to have been
introduced by the plaintiff. Cf. Foard Co. v. State, 219 Fed. 827 (C. C. A.
4th, 1914); Note (1920) 4 MINN. L. REv. 219, 227. The decision may well
mark the beginning of a policy of holding the parent corporation responsible
for the acts of the subsidiary. But if it be assumed that a corporation, like
an individual, may by means of the corporate device elect to risk only a
certain portion of its assets in any one enterprise, then the instant de-
cision appears to be incorrectly decided.
EMINENT DOMAIN-RIGHT OF WAY-NECESSITY AS GROUNDS FOR CON-
DEMNATION PROCEEDINGs.-The petitioner instituted eminent domain pro-
ceedings to condemn a location for a pumping station and a right of way
for a pipe line for irrigation purposes. At the time of the proceeding the
petitioner and his predecessor had operated for ten years under a contract
by which the owners of the land sought to be condemned had granted a right
of way for such a pipe line in return for the privilege of taking a specified
quantity of water therefrom. This contract provided that the power to
acquire said right of way by condemnation should be regarded as waived.
An order of necessity was granted by the lower court and the order was
affirmed on certiorari (three judges dissenting). State ex Tel. Henry v.
Superior Court, 284 Pac. 788 (Wash. 1930).
The term "necessity" as used in eminent domain proceedings does not
signify absolute indispensability, but is construed as meaning reasonable
necessity in view of the circumstances peculiar to each case. State cx rel.
Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 503, 144 Pac. 722
(1914); Mobile & Girard R. R. v. Alabama Midland Ry., 87 Ala. 501, 6
So. 406 (1888); 2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 601. It is
sometimes said that a reasonable necessity for a road exists when there
is no other practicable or feasible way out. State ex rel. Sehleif V. Superior
Court, 119 Wash. 372, 205 Pac. 1046 (1922). Thus, where a floatable river
was available, a logging company was not entitled to maintain proceedings
to condemn a way over private property. State ex rel. Stephens v. Superior
Court, 111 Wash. 205, 190 Pac. 234 (1920). And where a railroad over
the same land sought to be condemned was contemplated in the future, the
exclusion of evidence, on the issue of necessity, that such railroad would
be available for the petitioner's use, was error. Ruddocle v. Bloedel Done-
van Lumber Mills, 28 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928). It was contended
for the defendant in the instant case that in view of the contract between
the parties there was no necessity for the taking. Little doubt as to the
necessity would exist if the petitioner had merely a parol license to use
the land sought to be condemned. See Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Min-
neapolis Western Ry., 61 Minn. 502, 508, 63 N. W. 1035, 1037 (1895). Or
if he had only a one-year lease with an option to renew for such other time
as he might retain possession of the land. State ex rel. Preston Mill Co. v.
Superior Court, 91 Wash. 249, 157 Pac. 689 (1916). Or if the agreement
had been for another route found to be impracticable for present purposes.
See State ex tel. Eastern Railway & Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 127
Wash. 30, 33, 219 Pac. 857, 858 (1923). The court in the instant case
correctly held that the waiver clause in the contract was ineffectual. The
power to take by eminent domain cannot be bargained away by contract.
Cf. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brookly,, 166 U. S. 685, 17 Sup. Ct.
718 (1879) ; Cornwall v. L. & N. R. R., 87 Ky. 72, 7 S. W. 553 (1888). But
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if, as the dissenting opinion insists, the right of way acquired by the peti-
tioner under the contract was sufficient for all present and prospective
needs, and no enlarged right of way was obtainable by condemnation, then
it would seem that the petitioner's only object was to escape the burden
of his contractual obligations. A way of necessity cannot be secured
simply because it -will be less expensive for the applicant than the one he
already possesses. State ex rel. Carlson v. Superior Court, 107 Wash.
228, 181 Pac. 689 (1919); 1 LEIWeS, op. cit. supra § 260.
EMPLOYERS' Ll-iALITy-FEDERAL Acr-PERIOD op LIMITATIONS-AcTION
FOR DEATH.-Plaintiff's testator, an employee of the defendant railroad
was injured by the defendant in 1923 and died in 1928. Plaintiff brought
suit in 1929 under the Federal Employer's Liability Act to recover for
pecuniary loss to the testator's widow and children, alleging that the injury
and death were caused by the defendant's negligence. The defendant
demurred on the ground that the action was barred by the two year period
of limitation imposed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. [35 STAT. 66
(1908), 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-59 (1926)]. The lower court
sustained the demurrer and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. Flynn
v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 149 Atl. 682 (Conn. 1930).
It is generally stated that the right of action for wrongful death depends
upon the existence of a right of action in the decedent at the time of death
so that a judgment and satisfaction, or settlement and release, obtained
by the decedent, bars a subsequent action brought by the personal represen-
tative. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Oliver, 261 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919);
Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335, 48 Sup. Ct. 541 (1928) ; (1928) 13 Mix.
L. REv. 47. Contra: Rowe v. Richards, 35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W. 1001, L.
R. A. 1915E 1075 (1915). See Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death
and Survival Statutes (1924) 23 MicH. L. Rv. 114. This premise has led
to the conclusion of the instant case that the right of action of the per-
sonal representative is barred if the decedent's action was not brought
within the time prescribed by statute. Cf. Rodgers v. Pa. R. R., 19
F. (2d) 522 (E. D. N. Y. 1927) ; Kelliher v. X. Y. C. & H. R. R., 212 N. Y.
207, 105 N. E. 824, L. R. A. 1915E 1178 (1914). Yet some courts have
reached the opposite conclusion since the requirement that the decedent
should have been able to maintain an action is nowhere specifically expressed
in the Federal Employers' Liability Act nor in many of the state statutes.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Preston, 254 Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918) ;
Donnelly v. Chicago Ry., 163 Ill. App. 7 (1911); cf. Little v. Blue Goosc
Motor Coach Co., 224 Ill. App. 427 (1927). And other courts holding con-
trary to the principal case, inzist that the statute of limitations cannot
begin to run against the claim for damages for the wrongful death until .he
cause of action has accrued by death having occurred. Louisville & St. Louis
R. R. v. Clark 152 U. S. 230, 14 Sup. Ct. 579 (1894); German American
Trust Co. v. Lafayette Box Board Co., 52 Ind. App. 211, 98 N. E. 874
(1912) ; Causey v. Seaboard Air Line Co., 166 N. C. 5, 81 S. E. 917 (1014),
L. R. A. 1915E 1185. The effect of the instant decision is to prohibit an
action for damages for a death which takes place more than two years
after the injury. It has to recommend it all the usual arguments in favor
of any statute of limitations. Cf. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. R. v. Carroll,
50 Sup. Ct. 182 (U. S. 1930); Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U. S. 58, 46
Sup. Ct. 405 (1926); (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1067; (1926) 11 Mi'N. L.
REv. 73; (1927) 22 ILL. L. REV. 329. And while such decisions may lead
to hardship in the few cases of latent or undiscovered injuries, it would
seem that a contrary holding would open the doors to a multitude of doubt-
ful claims whenever death occurs long after the injury.
1930] 1213
1214 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
EVIENE--ADMISSIBILHY OF BOOK ENTRIES-CONSTRUCTION OF NEW
YORK STATUTE.-In an action to recover damages for the wrongful death
of the plaintiff's intestate, the defendant offered in evidence a policeman's
report of the statements of bystanders filed at the station house. The
New York Civil Practice Act authorizes the admission of records if "made
in the regular course of any business" provided that "it was the regular
course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time
of such act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time
thereafter." It is further provided that: "All other circumstances of the
making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge
by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall
not affect its admissibility. The term business shall include business, pro-
fession, occupation and calling of every kind." [N. Y. C. P. A. § 374-a,
added by laws 1928, c. 532.] In sustaining the lower court's decision, the
Court of Appeals held that the statute did not permit the admission of
this report since it was not made in the regular course of a business or
calling by persons under a duty to impart the information. Johnson v.
Lutz, 170 N. E. 517 (N. Y. 1930).
Verified regular entries or reports are admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule when made in the regular course of business from reports
of others after a showing that the original observers are deceased, insane,
or absent from the jurisdiction. American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 72 Fed.
470 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896); Dameron v. Harris, 281 Mo. 247, 219 S. W. 954
(1920); Squires v. O'Connell, 91 Vt. 35, 99 At]. 268 (1916). A more liberal
rule in some states will now admit verified regular reports without requir-
ing the original observers to be produced when such observers are unavail-
able or the cost of tracing and producing them would be prohibitory.
Reyburn v. Queen City S. B. & T. Co., 171 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909);
Louisville & N. Ry. v. Daniel, 122 Ky. 256, 91 S. W. 691 (1906); Wells
Whip Co. v. Tanners' Ins. Co., 209 Penn. 488, 58 At]. 894 (1904); 3 WiG-
.Noim, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1530. However, in New York, as in most
jurisdictions, the rule was narrowly restricted to entries of information
communicated by one who had personal knowledge and whose duty it was
to make the report. Mayor v. Second Ave. R. R., 102 N. Y. 572, 7 N. E.
905 (1886) ; cf. Pennsylvania Co. v. MeCaffrey, 173 Ill. 169, 50 N. E. 713
(1898); Comment (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 245. The restricted ruling has
been severely criticized as not being in conformity with business practice.
WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra; MORGAN AND OTHERS, LAW OF EVIDENCE (1927)
50. And the statute in the instant case was proposed in order to change
the law to conform with current practices. MORGAN AND OTHERS, op. Cit.
supra at 63. It seems clear that the statute was intended to include busi-
nesses and callings of every kind and to dispense with the personal knowl-
edge as well as the duty to make reports previously required for admissi-
bility. See RICHARDSON, LAW OF EVIDENCE (1928) 188. In the instant
case, the first under the statute, the lower court decision might well have
been affirmed on the ground that the original observors were not unavail-
able, or upon the ground, perhaps, that the reports were not made in the
-course of the by-standers' "business, profession, occupation, and calling."
Cf. Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey, supra. But in upholding the lower court
'because the information was not "imparted by persons who were under
a duty to impart such information," the court has restricted the statute
to a mere codification of the rule in Mayor v.. Second Ave. R. R., supra.
But cf. Note (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 476.
MASTER AND SERVANT-SPECIAL POLICEIEN-LIABILITY OF MINE OP-
=RTORS FOR TORTS OF COAL AND IRON POLICE.-During a strike against the
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defendant coal company, the plaintiff, an officer of the Mine Workers'
Union, was addressing a group of strike-breakers on the public highway
when he was arrested for disorderly conduct by three coal and iron police-
men. These officers had been commissioned by the Governor and invested
with the powers of municipal policemen, but were selected, paid, and subject
to discharge by the defendant. [PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 18548]. The
plaintiff was convicted by a magistrate, but the decision was reversed on
appeal. In a subsequent suit for false imprisonment, the lower court gave
judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, this decision was reversed on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption that
the policemen were acting as officers of the state and not as zer-:ants of
the defendant. Fagan v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 149 Atl. 159
(Pa. 1930).
Although this is the first reported case concerning the liability of private
employers for the tortious acts of members of the coal and iron police of
Pennsylvania, there have been many cases concerned with the legal status
of special railroad police similarly appointed and of special deputies selected
and paid by private individuals. See Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 645, 681;
Note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 1197. The rule usually stated is that the em-
ployer of a special policeman is liable for the torts which the latter com-
mits in his capacity as a private servant but not for torts committed in his
capacity as an officer of the state. 39 C. J. § 1461; see Kusnir v. Pressed
Steel Car Ca., 201 Fed. 146 (S. D. N. Y. 1912) ; Tucker v. Eric R. R., 69
N. J. L. 19, 54 Atl. 557 (1903). Since it is for the jury to apply the rule
results are not easily.classified or predicted, but they are at least partly
controlled by the manner in which the instructions present the issue. In
jurisdictions where, because of statute or the unorthodox doctrine of the
highist court, a special policeman is prima facie a private servant, the
jury need determine only whether he acted within the scope of his employ-
ment; and his employer is usually held liable. Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Offutt, 204 Ky. 51, 263 S. W. 665 (1924) ; Louistille & N. R. R. v. Mason,
199 Ky. 337, 251 S. W. 184 (1923); Armstrong v. Stair, 217 Mlass. 534,
105 N. E. 442 (1914). In jurisdictions in which no presumption as to the
officer's capacity is raised, it is entirely for the jury to determine whether
the policeman acted as a public or a private servant, and his employer is
often found liable. Scipio v. Pioneer Mining & Mfg. Co., 166 Ala. 666,
52 So. 43 (1910); Shope v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., 195 Ala. 312, 70 So.
279 (1915); Sharpe v. Erie R. R., 184 N. Y. 100, 76 N. E. 923 (1906). But
the presumption indulged in Pennsylvania and a few other jurisdictions,
that the special policeman acts as a servant of the state, tends to force
a finding for the defendant or a reversal of a finding for the plaintiff,
so that the employer is seldom held liable. Finfrock v. Northern C. Ry.,
58 Pa. Sup. Ct. 52 (1914); Layne v. C. & 0. Ry., 66 W. Va. 607, 67 S. E.
1103 (1909). Theoretically this presumption is rebuttable by evidence
showing either express or implied authority from the private employer;
practically it is almost conclusive because the facts of express authority
are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and implied au-
thority may not be argued from the nature of the employment itself.
Ruffner v. Jameson Coal & Coke Co., 247 Pa. 34, 92 Atl. 1075 (1915);
Keidel v.B. & 0. R. R., 281 Pa. 289, 126 Atl. 770 (1924). But cf. Tafghin3ky
v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 61 Pa. Sup. Ct. 121 (1915). Some courts
apply the presumption only when the special policeman is also a regular
member of a municipal police force and subject to the orders of the chief
of police. Pennsylvani R. R. v. Kelly, 177 Fed. 189 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910);
Adler -v. White City Const. Co., 147 Ill. App. 20 (1909) ; Samuel x. Wana-
maker, 107 App. Div. 433, 95 N. Y. Supp. 270 (1st Dep't 1905). But its
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application to cases of the instant sort disregards the fact that the coal
and iron police receive orders from none but their private employers. Cf.
Shalloo, The Private Police of Pennsylvania (1929) 146 ANN. AM. AcAD.
Soc. & POL. Sci. 55. And the conclusion of the court is strikingly at var-
iance with the reports of investigators who have found the coal and iron
police not so much public officers as hired gunmen, whose brutal and lawless
conduct has largely contributed to the bitter industrial warfare in the
Pennsylvania coal mines. 1 REP. U. S. COAL COMM. 163 (1922); cf. LANE,
DENIAL OF CIVIL LmERIrs IN THE COAL MINES (1924) c. 4 & 5; Woltman
and Munn, Cossacks (1928) 15 AMERICAN MERCURY 399; Chafee, Coal and
Civil Liberties, (1923) REP. to U. S. COAL COMM. (unpublished). A recent
Pennsylvania statute changes the official name of the coal and iron police
to Industrial Police and requires bonds for the faithful performance of
their duties [Pa. Laws 1929, No. 2433; but this statute does not seem to
affect the civil liability of the policemen or the employers and has been
characterized as an ineffective gesture. Shalloo, op. cit. supra. That the
application of stricter rules of liability might have been a more effective
check on lawless conduct the court apparently did not consider. The case
seems an unfortunate example of the mechanical application of rules of
vicarious liability without regard to the social factors which underlie
them and the practical consequences which they may produce. Cf. Laski,
The Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916) 26 YALE L. J. 105.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PROFIT-PRODUCING ENTERPRISES-CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEBr LIMITs.-Defendant city planned to enter into a contract for
the erection and subsequent purchase of an electrical power plant and dis-
tributing system. The contract provided that the purchase price was not
a general liability of the municipality but was payable in installtnents
from a special fund supplied from rates collected for the service and that
no payments would be made unless the fund were sufficiently large to
meet the installments falling due. A writ prohibiting the municipality from
entering into the contract was granted by the trial court. Upon appeal the
writ was made permanent on the ground that such a contract was in
violation of Art. 8, § 3 of the Constitution of Idaho providing: "No . . .
city . . . shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for
any purpose exceeding in that year the income and revenues provided for
it for such year without assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors
thereof . . . ." Miller v. City of Buhl, 284 Pac. 843 (Idaho 1930).
The purpose of constitutional provisions limiting municipal indebted-
ness is to curb reckless expenditures and limit improvements to a pay-as-
you-go plan. 6 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 2365.
Some courts, mindful of this purpose, maintain that a contract amounting
to a total obligation exceeding the difference between the total annual in-
debtedness which the city may incur and the liabilities already incurred in
that year is void, even though the contractual obligation is payable in
annual installments no one of which would in any year raise the city's
liabilities beyond the constitutional limit. Jones v. Rutherford, 225 Ky.
773, 10 S. W. (2d) 296 (1928). Cf. Muir v. Murray City, 55 Utah 368,
186 Pac. 433 (1919). These constitutional provisions have been success-
fully evaded by "piece-meal construction" contracts. Falls City Construc-
tion Co. v. Fiscal Court, 160 Ky. 623, 170 S. W. 26 (1914). Likewise the
constitutional exemption for "necessary expenses" has lent itself to the
same purpose. Caldwell County v. Sidney Spitzer & Co., 173 N. C. 147,
91 S. E. 707 (1917) (county orphans' home); Lacy v. Fidelity Bank, 183
N. C. 373, 111 S. E. 612 (1922) (schoolhouse under compulsory education
act); Jones v. Power County, 27 Idaho 656, 150 Pac. 35 (1915) (county
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house in newly organized county). But cf. Hollowell r. Borden, 148 N.
C. 255, 61 S. E. 638 (1908) (schoolhouse before compulsory education act) ;
Ball v. Bannock County, 5 Idaho 602, 51 Pac. 454 (1897) (county building).
In profit-producing enterprises the debt limitation provision is applicable
to contracts providing for annual installment payments, which are to be
within the income from the industry for each year, whenever the project
involves a possible liability of the municipality if the income should fal
short of the annual payment. Holingren v. City of Moline. 269 I1. 248,
109 N. E. 1031 (1915); Lobdell v. City of Chicago, 227 Ill. 218, 81 N. E.
354 (1907). Ironwood Waterworks Co. v. Trebilcock, 99 Blich. 454, 58
N. W. 371 (1894). Contra: City of Bowling Green .. Kirby. 220 Ky. 839,
295 S. W. 1004 (1927) (statutory mortgage lien would permit bondholders
to enforce all mortgage rights except compulsory sale of property). The
tendency is, however, to hold the constitutional provision inapplicable
whenever the contract contains a stipulation, as in the instant case, that
the municipality has no liability beyond making annual payments from
a special fund when, and only when, the income from the enterprise swells
the fund sufficiently to allow the payment. Twichell v. City of Seattle, 106
Wash. 32, 179 Pac. 127 (1919); Winston v. Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 41
Pac. 888 (1895); ef. Shelton v. City of Los Angeles, 275 Pac. 421 (Cal.
1929). Contra: Feil -v. Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 Pac. 643 (1912), 43
L. R. A. (N.s.) 1095 (1913); Lesser v. Warren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 85
Atl. 839 (1912) (property subject to foreclosure proceedings in default of
payments even though city expressly absolvdi from any liability in the
contract). Unqualified adherence to a single precedent seems to be the
major justification for the instant holding. Cf. Feil v. Coeur d'Alene,
supra. The undoubted benefits to a community from a profit-producing
enterprise which the members of the community finance and to some de-
gree control, and the contractual stipulations throwing the risk of loss
upon the subscribers rather than upon the city, would seem to indicate
that the constitutional provisions regarding limitations on municipal in-
debtedness were never intended for the situation presented by the instant
case. Cf. DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1928) 467.
RFxL PROPERTY-CoVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND-CRADITOR-BENE-
FICIARIEs-LAw AND EQuirY.-Plaintiff and defendant were lessees of stores
in the same building. The lessor of the plaintiff's assignor had covenanted
not to let any other store for a restaurant during the term of that lease.
In the defendant's lease from a subsequent owner was a provision against
his use of the premises as a restaurant until after the expiration of the
prior lease, which had previously been assigned to the plaintiff. In an
action for damages for violation of that covenant by the defendant, a
motion to dismiss the complaint was granted, the court holding that the
covenant by the original lessor created a right in the plaintiff enforceable
only in equity, and that the covenant in the defendant's lease was not
made for the plaintiff's benefit. Safran v. Westrich, 210 N. Y. Supp. 238
(Sup. Ct. 1930).
Among the contracts generally recognized as creating a legal right in a
stranger to the agreement are those of the "creditor-beneficiary" type in
which the promise sought to be enforced has been procured for the purpose
of discharging a legal or equitable obligation owed by the promisee to
the beneficiary. Laurrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859); 1 WILLISToN,
CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 362, 381; Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third
Persons (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 1008, 1013. Contra: National Bank v.
Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123 (1878). It is submitted that such an obligation
existed in the instant case, since the defendant's promisee and the plaintiff
19301 1217
YALE LAW JOURNAL
were assignees respectively of the lessor covenantor and the lessee covenan-
tee. When an owner of property leases a portion thereof to be used for a
definite purpose, at the same time covenanting not to let any part of
the residue for competitive use, the benefit of such covenant may run with
the term at law. Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136 (N. Y. 1837); Ricketts
v. Enfield Churchwardens, [1909] 1 Ch. 544; cf. Union Bank v. Segur, 39
N. J. L. 173 (1877); see Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913) 388;
Clark, The Doctrine of Privity of Estate in Connection with Real Covenants
(1922) 32 YALE L. J. 123, 128. Contra: Thomas v. Hayward, L. R. 4 Ex.
311 (1869). It is true that the burden cannot run with the reversion,
when-it affects only property separate and distinct from the demised prem-
ises. Dewar v. Goodman, [1907] 1 K. B. 612; Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md.
487 (1870); Bigelow, The Contents of Covenants in Leases (1914) 12
MICH. L. REv. 639, 657, (1914) 30 L. Q. REv. 319, 337. Yet the burden
might well be said to attach to the restricted property, and some cases,
apparently adopting this view, have held that the assignee of the lessor's
interest in both the leased and the restricted premises was bound at law
by the covenant. Athl v. R. R., 3 Ir. R. C. L. 333 (1868); cf. Noonan v.
Orton, 27 Wis. 300 (1820); CLARx, REAL COVENANTS (1929) 75 et seq.
Moreover, such a covenant is frequently enforced according to the equit-
able principle binding subsequent holders of the restricted property, who
take with notice of the covenant. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. '174 (1848);
Snavely v. Berman, 143 Md. 75, 121 Atl. 842 (1923); McBride Realty Co.
v. Grace, 15 S. W. (2d) 957 (Mo. App. 1929); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1425; Clark, The Assignability of Easemcnts, Profits
and Equitable Restrictions (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 139. Whichever
theory be adopted, the lessor's assignee is under a definite obligation to
the lessee of such a nature as to satisfy the requirements of the creditor-
beneficiary doctrine. Vogeler v. Alwyn Improvement Corp., 247 N. Y. 131,
159 N. E. 886 (1928); Note (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 619. Moreover
this obligation is not discharged by literal compliance with the covenant
not to rent, but requires affirmative effectuation of the intended result.
Snavely v. Berman. supra; Hiatt Inv. Co. v. Buchler, 16 S. W. (2d) 219
(Mo. App. 1929) ; see (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 1161. Since the provision
in the instant defendant's lease was inserted for the sole purpose of dis-
charging that obligation, the plaintiff was clearly entitled to sue at law
on the promise. Furthermore, the court conceded the plaintiff a cause of
action in equity. And since the codes supposedly eliminate the formal
distinction between suits at law and suits in equity, the dismissal of an
otherwise valid complaint because it proceeded upon a mistaken legal theory
would seem entirely unjustified. Cf. Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270
(1858); N. Y. Ice Co. v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 357 (1861);
Clark, The Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 1. But cf.
Reubens v. Joel, 13 N. Y. 488 (1856); Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149,
118 N. E. 512 (1917).
TRIAL-POLLING OF JURY-EFFECT OF A JUROR'S DiSSENT.-A jury brought
in a verdict for the defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff requested a poll,
and one juror replied that it was not his verdict. Upon detailed question-
ing by the court it appeared that the juror had finally consented to the
verdict, after it had been: agreed in the jury-room that a three-fourths
majority vote should decide. The trial court overruled a motion for a new
trial. On appeal, it was held that after the juror had replied that the
verdict was not his, it was reversible error to receive and record it. San-
ders v. Charleston Ry., 151 S. E. 438 (S. C. 1930).
Members of a jury usually may not impeach their own verdict. Sanitary
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District v. Cuflerton, 147 IlM. 385 (1893); State v. Cash, 138 S. C. 167,
136 S. E. 222 (1926). But see (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 503 (exceptions to
general rule). Polling the jury, however, seems never to have been con-
sidered an attempt to impeach the verdict. See 2 THoMPSo , TfRALS (2d
ed. 1912) § 2632; cf. Bishop v. Muggler, 33 Kan. 145, 5 Pac. 756 (1885);
Root v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. 68 (N. Y. 1810). If upon a poll one or more
jurors dissent from the verdict as announced by the foreman, in a large
majority of jurisdictions .it is held proper to order the jury to retire for
further deliberation. State v. Waltermath, 162 Wis. 602, 156 N. W. 946
(1916); Malcon Ry. v. Barnes, 121 Ga. 444, 49 S. E. 282 (1904) ; State V.
Johnson, 141 La. 775, 75 So. 678 (1917); cf. Kramer v. Kister, 187 Pa.
227, 40 Atl. 1008 (1898) (dissent by a juror in open court a mistrial). In
many states, questions on the poll are limited strictly to the fact of the
juror's concurrence in the verdict. Moss v. State, 152 Ala. 30, 44 So. 598
(1907) (improper to ask if juror gave up honest convictions); State 1'.
Hubbs, 294 Mlo. 224, 242 S. W. 675 (1922). In others, even where a juror
at first hesitates, if he finally states that he consented to the verdict it
will be sustained. Hughes, v. Detroit Ry., 78 Mich. 399, 44 N. IV. 396
(1899) (juror finally assented to verdict after being twice stopped by court
from making speech); State v. Asher, 63 Mont. 302, 206 Pac. 1091 (1922)
(juror first replied he concurred only with understanding sentence would
be suspended, then agreed it was his verdict); State v. Millroy, 103 Wash.
193, 174 Pac. 10 (1918) (juror answering "it was either that or a hung
jury," told to answer "yes" or "no," replied "yes"); State v. Nutter, 99
W. Va. 146, 128 S. E. 142 (1925) (juror declared his assent to verdict
based upon jury-room compromise). It would seem, however, that the
better rule would permit a juror to dissent from the verdict as agreed until
the time when it is recorded in open court, thereby minimizing the danger
of intimidation of a minority in the jury room. Cf. Devereux r. Champion
Cotton Co., 14 S. C. 396 (1880) ; Week.s v. Hart, 24 Hun. 181 (N. Y. 1881).
The rule of the instant case likewise prevents the trial court from inquir-
ing beyond the juror's present declaration that the verdict is not his and
perhaps sustaining the verdict by persuading him to admit that he did
assent to it in the jury-room.
TRuSTS-CY PRES-EDCATIONAL BEQUESTS-GENERAL OP SPECFIC IN-
TENT.-The testator left a legacy to Harvard University to be used in
founding courses in eugenics relating particularly to the treatment of
defective and criminal classes by surgical procedures as advocated in a
book published by the testator. Harvard University refused the bequest
and the lower court appointed a new trustee to administer the fund cy
pres. The plaintiff, the testator's administrator, appealed on the ground
that the charitable gift had been created on a condition or for a special
purpose, which had failed, and that the legacy therefore reverted to the
testator's heirs. The judgment of the lower court, however, was affirmed.
In re Mears' Estate, 149 Atl. 157 (Pa. 1930).
In the United States the judicial cj pres doctrine is usually invoked to
prevent the failure of a valid educational trust if the donor has manifested
a general charitable intent. In re Hunter's Estate, 279 Pa. 349, 123 At.
865 (1924); ZoLL.AN, AbEIp.cAN LAw OF CHARITIES (1924) § 123; see
(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 437. A few states have repudiated the doctrine.
Mars v. Gibert, 93 S. C. 455, 77 S. E. 131 (1913) ; Trstees of Cimberland
University v. Caldwell, 203 Ala. 590, 84 So. 846 (1920): see (1923) 8
CORN. L. Q. 179. And in no state can the trustees apply it on their own
initiative. Lakatong Lodge v. Board of Education, 84 N. J. .Eq. 112,
92 Atl. 870 (1915); Trustees of Andover Theological Seminary v. Visitors
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of Andover Theological Institution, 253 Mass. 256, 148 N. E. 900 (1925);
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 643. Moreover any alterations in the donor's scheme
will be forbidden if the donor's intention, as evidenced by the wording of
the instrument or the purpose of the gift, is interpreted as specific. Har-
vard College v. Attorney Gen., 228 Mass. 396, 117 N. E. 903 (1917). But
cf. Lupton v. Leander Clark College, 194 Iowa 1008, 187 N. W. 496 (1922)
(gift to a college on condition that it never be diverted and that the col-
lege be named after the donor could be administered by another college).
If the intent is said to be general, as in the instant case, the proposed
alteration must nevertheless conform as nearly as possible to the donor's
directions. Mason v. Bloomington Library Ass'n, 237 Il1. 442, 86 N. E.
1044 (1909) (fund to establish an art gallery connected with a certain
library might be similarly administered by another library); Trustees of
Rush Medical College v. Chicago University, 312 111. 109, 143 N. E. 434
(1924) (gifts to medical school in Chicago could be used by Chicago Uni-
versity for medical education) ; Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church v.
Scarritt Collegiate Institute, 264 Mo. 713, 175 S. W. 571 (1915) (gift to
church college might be intrusted to another college under same church,
but could not be used for education only nor for building a church); cf.
Curtis & Barker v. University of Iowa, 188 Iowa 300, 176 N. W. 330
(1920) (gift to a Baptist college on condition the college remain in the
town of Pella under Baptist control could not be transferred to a Dutch
Reformed college in Des Moines). It is generally held that cy pros can
not be invoked unless alterations in the settlor's original scheme be deemed
absolutely necessary. Harvard College v. Society for Theological Educa-
tion, 3 Gray 280 (Mass. 1885) (inapplicable to authorize separation of
college and theology department on grounds of expediency) ; Allen V. Trus-
tees of Nasson Institute, 107 Me. 120, 77 Atl. 638 (1910) (not applicable
although fund was at the time insufficient to form specified school); Har-
vard College v. Att'y Gen., supra. But of. Ely v. Malone, 202 Mass. 545,
89 N. E. 166 (1909) (applied where fund was insufficient to build school).
A few courts have held that expediency is sufficient to justify alterations
cy pres. Adams Female Academy v. Adams, 65 N. H. 225, 18 Atl. 777
(1889) (funds for private girls school, no longer wanted, used for public
schools of both sexes); Inglish v. Johnson, 95 S. W. 558 (Tex. Civ. App.
1906) (same). Inasmuch as it seems a questionable policy, particularly
in educational matters, to allow deceased individuals to control the dis-
position of funds, according to ideas which have become antiquated or
impracticable, those decisions which invoke the doctrine of cy pres on the
ground of expediency seem highly commendable. See Scott, Education
and the Dead Hand (1920) 34 HARe. L. REv. 1. Moreover, since the
donor's general or specific intention is so frequently, as in the instant case,
a matter of speculation, there is little justification for permitting a narrow
interpretation to defeat the trust where a broad one, which would sustain
it, is possible. Cf. Willard, Illustrations of the Origins of Cy Pres (1894)
8 HARv. L. REV. 69.
ZONING--LAND VALUE DEPRECIATION CAUSED BY ORDINANCE AS GROUND
FOR RELUF.-The petitioner owned unimproved land on a main thoroughfare
in the immediate vicinity of a business development. Evidence showed that
for commercial purposes the property was worth.from $90,000 to $100,000,
and for residential purposes from $12,500 to $20,000. A zoning ordinance
was passed classifying the property as restricted to residential use. The
complainant then petitioned the board of adjustment for the removal of
his land from the zoned district. Later, without having appealed from
the adverse ruling of the board on his request, he filed a petition under
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the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act to determine the constitutionality
of the ordinance as applied to his land. The trial court found, in addition
to the loss in value, that the property was unsuitable for residential pur-
poses and especially adaptable for business use, and that by putting it to
commercial use adjacent property values would not be adversely affected.
It held that the application of the ordinance to this particular property
was therefore unreasonable and confiscatory, and that the ordinance was
in that respect unconstitutional. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.
Taylor v. Haverford Tounship, 149 Atl. 639 (Pa. 1930).
It has often been judicially asserted that the courts will not interfere
with the determinations of zoning authorities unless it is clear that the
restrictions sought to be imposed bear no real or substantial relationship
to public health, safety, or welfare. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U. S. 365, 395, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 121 (1927); People v. Clarke, 216 App.
Div. 351, 361, 215 N. Y. Supp. 190, 196 (2d Dep't 1926). Hence the fact
that an ordinance causes a depreciation in property values should not of
itself have any weight. Gf. Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99
(1923); Wu.fsohn. v. Burden, 241 N. Y. 288, 150 N. E. 120 (1925).
Nevertheless the question arises constantly, especially where property
which is restricted under a zoning ordinance to residential development
could be used more profitably for commercial purposes. Cf. Zahn v.. Board
of Public Works, 274 U. S. 325, 47 Sup. Ct. 594 (1921) ; Spector v. Build-
ing Inspector, 250 Mass. 63, 145 N. E. 265 (1924). In such instances,
elements of special or great hardship are frequently held to justify relief in
the individual case. Heffernan v. Board of Appeal, 144 AtL G74 (R. L
1929). It is fairly well settled, for instance, that if the land is so unfit
for the use to which it is limited by the ordinance that it will become
worthless if thus restricted, the ordinance will not be enforced. Terrace
Park v. E-rrett, 12 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) (gravel bed zoned for
residential use); North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Blich. 52, 227 N. W. 743
(1929) (marsh land restricted to residential development). But ef. Marble-
head Land Co. v. Los Angeles, 36 F. (2d) 242 (S. D. Cal. 1929) (oil
land zoned and held suitable for residential purposes). Some courts have
gone farther and held that where the loss is great, the mere fact that
land zoned for residences is within or in close proximity to a business
district may warrant relief. Willerup v. Hcmpstcad, 120 Misc. 485, 199
N. Y. Supp. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Sundlun v. Board of Appeal, 145 Atl.
451 (R. L 1929). Where none of these factors is unqualifiedly present
but where the value of the land has so depreciated on account of the zoning
ordinance that there can be no adequate return on any investment for its
development, the decisions are not uniform. Cf. Nectow v. Cambridge,
277 U. S. 184, 48 Sup. Ct. 447 (1928) (relief granted); American Wood
Products Co. v. Minneapolis, 35 F. (2d) 657 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) (relief
refused)-. The instant case, on its facts, can doubtless be brought within
one of the established categories where relief is allowed. Yet the exclusive
emphasis placed by the court on loss in value seems unfortunate, since
the salutary effects of zoning will be jeopardized if that criterion comes
to be regarded as decisive. See Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 735, 737.
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